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Abstract 
The environment in which space systems are developed and operated can be classified as nothing 
less than dynamic.  However, it is clear that the methods and tools relied on in conceptual design 
are based on static assumptions and leave little room for anything more than snapshots of the 
product and its environment.  This paper introduces an approach to challenge that model and 
instead quantify and compare space system architectures around the central theme of uncertainty, 
with emphasis on policy uncertainty, as well as, technical and market uncertainty.  Two cases of 
implementation are presented and three generalized principles are proposed that flow from the 
analysis: 1) engineering systems must be designed with uncertainty as one of the central 
organizing principles, 2) since engineering systems have management and social dimensions and 
thus involve human interactions, there is an irreducible uncertainty associated with these 
dimensions that will affect the design of the system, and 3) uncertainty in use may allow the 
engineering system to satisfy quite different missions from the original one intended. 
Introduction 
There has been much debate about what constitutes an engineering system and if there are any 
fundamental principles underlying the design and operation of these systems. In this paper we 
examine a particular class of engineering systems as a paradigm for what can be learned about 
the broader notions of engineering systems. The class of engineering systems that we will 
consider is military and commercial space system architectures. We will take the point of view in 
this paper that engineering systems are complex systems that are technologically enabled (i.e. 
depend for their existence on products created by technology and using technology). They are 
also systems that involve interactions at the enterprise or societal levels. 
The term space system architecture is used here to cover all the aspects of the space system and 
their interactions and interfaces that allow the function to be delivered to the users. For example, 
the Global Position System (GPS) [1] space system architecture delivers real time precise 
position and timing information to users on a worldwide basis. It is composed of 24 satellites in 
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) that emit timing signals, a set of distributed ground stations that 
communicate with the satellites, a set of command and control centers that periodically inform 
the satellites of their positions and the user handsets that calculate time and position based on the 
signals from four GPS satellites. We choose to focus on military and commercial space systems 
rather than scientific space systems (e.g Hubble or Galileo) because they have the following 
properties. They are technologically enabled, complex (literally “rocket science”), global in scale 
(literally in the sense that the functions of such systems can be delivered all over the globe) and 
involve direct interactions with large numbers of people (in the military case with large numbers 
of dispersed forces, both friendly and hostile, in the commercial case with large markets needing 
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communications or remote sensing). Typically, scientific systems have direct interactions with 
small numbers of scientists and the interaction at the societal level is through the support of 
national governments. For example, Hubble operations are funded through NASA that is funded 
by the US Congress but the direct recipients of the functions of Hubble are a small number of 
astronomers.  
An excellent example of a complex space system architecture can be seen by looking at the 
systems that provide worldwide military communications. The national military strategy relies 
on information superiority and the need for worldwide communications has increased 
dramatically in recent years. In Desert Storm, the total data rate required was 100 Mbps while 
Allied Force, which deployed a force only 10% of the size of that used in Desert Storm forces, 
required 250 Mbps.  This increased data rate was provided largely by commercial geo-
synchronous satellite communication architectures  (over 75% by the end of Allied Force) 
supplemented by highly protected military communication satellites. The highly protected 
military satellite communications architecture right now is several MILSTAR satellites [1]. 
These are designed to provide worldwide communications to the National Command Authority 
in the event of a nuclear conflict. Thus, the architecture consists of some very complex and 
expensive satellites along with ground stations combined with less expensive commercial 
satellites with more capacity but owned by different stakeholders. 
The DoD also makes heavy use of other complex satellite architectures. The Defense Support 
Program (DSP) [1] provides missile warning at both the strategic and tactical level. This consists 
of a set of geo-synchronous infrared sensing satellites, a set of communication links, and a 
distributed set of information fusion centers as well as trained operators who interpret the data. 
The Global Positioning System as discussed above provides precision navigation and timing 
services worldwide. 
DSP, MILSTAR and GPS are all examples of (military) space system architectures. They have a 
number of characteristics that are of interest from the viewpoint of engineering systems. On the 
positive side, they are very high performance systems. In the case of DSP they give the US a 
strategic warning capability that only the Soviets matched. In the case of GPS, they have helped 
create a whole new industry based around knowing one’s position (Hertz NeverLost, plowing 
with GPS etc) as well as leading to a new way of fighting wars where bombs can be aimed as 
accurately as bullets. However, they have proven to be expensive to build (MILSTAR costing 
over a billion per satellite) and/or operate (GPS costing hundreds of millions a year to operate 
even though the satellite cost is only approximately 30 million per unit). 
These space system architectures traditionally define “cutting edge technology”. However, while 
most often these architectures, once constructed, deliver excellent performance, it is extremely 
rare that they deliver the initially promised performance on the initially proposed cost and 
schedule. There are several reasons for this but a large amount of the blame lies in the fact that 
there is a little understanding of how to incorporate uncertainty into the design process. 
The development of space systems is subject to not only cost, technical and market uncertainties, 
but also to uncertainties from the policy domain.  This paper introduces an approach to quantify 
and compare space system architectures under uncertainty, with emphasis on policy uncertainty 
as well as technical and market uncertainty. We then use the results to draw larger conclusions 
with respect to engineering systems.  
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The structure of the paper is as follows. We first define the major sources of uncertainty 
associated with military and commercial space system architectures. We then describe how we 
construct simulations of space system architectures in a way that allow both structured and 
unstructured uncertainty to be included and allow us to see large tradespaces of architectures and 
not just point designs. We then describe two specific architectural tradespaces. One is for an 
ionospheric mapper that will allow improvement in the ability to predict the effect of the 
ionosphere on GPS signals. The second is for a broadband communications architecture that will 
deliver space based T1 links to portable users on a worldwide basis. We use these two 
architectures as examples to illustrate the effects of market based, policy and technical 
uncertainty on the design of these types of systems. Finally we wrap up by considering the 
broader lessons for engineering systems. 
Major Sources of Uncertainty 
It is not trivial that this paper’s content is focused on uncertainty, rather than risk.  Uncertainty in 
this context is defined as our inability to deterministically predict an architecture’s value to the 
stakeholders of the system, i.e. company, customer, shareholders, users etc.  This is in contrast to 
the term risk that almost always reflects a negative meaning of the probability of loss or injury.  
The delineation is important, as it opens the research to aspects of uncertainty that may in fact be 
positive. 
 
Table 1: Uncertainty Categorization 
Development Uncertainty Operational Uncertainty 
Political Uncertainty- uncertainty of 
development funding instability 
Political Uncertainty- uncertainty of 
operational funding instability 
Requirements Uncertainty- 
uncertainty of requirements stability 
Lifetime Uncertainty - uncertainty of 
performing to requirements in a given 
lifetime 
Development Cost Uncertainty- 
uncertainty of developing within a 
given budget 
Obsolescence Uncertainty – uncertainty of 
performing to evolving expectation in a given 
lifetime 
Development Schedule Uncertainty-
uncertainty of developing within a 
given schedule profile  
Integration Uncertainty – uncertainty of 
operating within other necessary systems 
Development Technology 
Uncertainty- uncertainty of 
technology to provide performance 
benefits 
Operations Cost Uncertainty – uncertainty of 
meeting operations cost targets 
 Market Uncertainty-uncertainty in meeting 
demands of an unknown market 
Model Uncertainty 
 
 
The first step in any uncertainty analysis should be to develop a holistic view of uncertainties of 
potential architectures that enumerates all of the primary sources of risk over the lifecycle of the 
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space system.  The uncertainty structure that was developed is presented in Table 1.  This 
characterization helps to both encompass the various types of uncertainty but also serves as a 
framework for discussion.   
From an aerospace perspective, the life-cycle view on uncertainty is significant because its 
operational existence is as significant as the development perspective.  The reason this is 
typically overlooked is that the contractors and buyers are imminently interested in delivery of 
the product within time and fiscal constraints.  The operational context is therefore a secondary 
priority.  However, this framework gives us the opportunity to focus on the life-cycle uncertainty 
as life-cycle value has evolved to a design driver and decision criteria. 
Quantifying Uncertainty in Space System Architectures 
Risk and uncertainty are major decision criteria in the pursuit of space system design, and yet the 
ability to quantify and provide uncertainty information is not satisfactory.  From interviews with 
space architects and policy decision makers, uncertainty and risk analysis in conceptual design in 
the space industry at present can be characterized as qualitative, expert driven and point based.  
Moreover, uncertainties are evaluated individually, assessed and addressed as unique and any 
calculations of these uncertainties are not embedded in the end models of the designs. Finally, 
they are usually accounted for after a point design of an architecture has been chosen. 
 A more complete approach to design would provide a method for enabling the quantification 
and aggregation of uncertainty, as well as an approach to integrate that information into the 
design models in the earliest stage of the design.  We present two examples of incorporating 
uncertainty into the conceptual design of space systems in this paper.  Both are enabled by a 
conceptual design technique that provides for the exploration of potential architectures that we 
briefly describe in the next section. 
Modeling of Space System Architectures: GINA and MATE 
GINA and MATE analysis techniques enable mathematical modeling of many architecture 
candidates, and evaluation of those candidates in various cost-performance tradespaces.  GINA is 
the Generalized Information Network Analogy methodology, which had its beginnings at MIT.  
MATE is the Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration methodology, which also had its 
beginnings at MIT and built upon the GINA work. 
The GINA methodology [2, 3], allows for the rapid comparison of space systems by 
mathematically modeling them as information transfer networks.  GINA "is a hybrid of 
information network flow analysis, signal and antenna theory, space systems engineering and 
econometrics, and specifies measurable, unambiguous metrics for the cost, capability, 
performance and adaptability of any space system" whose mission is communications, 
navigation or remote sensing.  GINA specifies satellite system attributes as either part of a 
"design vector" or a "constants vector."  Attributes in the design vector vary across a given 
range, and distinguish one space system from another.  Attributes in the constants vector remain 
unchanged across all space systems under consideration.   
Rapid increases in computing power allowed GINA to expand over the years.  Further work by 
the Space Systems Laboratory extended GINA analysis to examine thousands of architectures 
simultaneously, whereas Shaw [3] examined hundreds simultaneously.  Jilla et al. [4] worked on 
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incorporating optimization algorithms into GINA to efficiently search a very large tradespace 
enabled hundreds of thousands of architectures to be analyzed simultaneously. 
MATE builds upon the GINA research, and generalizes space system performance modeling 
from an absolute cost-per-function scale to a scale based on the concept of utility in economic 
theory.  As in GINA, MATE separates architecture attributes into two categories:  Design vector 
and constants vector.  The performance measure for MATE is not cost-per-function like GINA, 
but a utility of the space system.  Overall utility is measured on several component dimensions 
by using certainty equivalent lotteries with the space system customer.  While utility is not an 
absolute measure, it is a useful relative measure for comparing how well different space system 
candidates satisfy a user’s needs [5]. 
MATE has been applied to a series of space system designs projects, including B-TOS and C-
TOS.  B-TOS is a terrestrial observer swarm of symbiotic distributed satellites whose mission is 
to map the ionosphere.  BTOS is the first example case that is discussed using the GINA/MATE 
framework. C-TOS undertook the detailed design of the space part of the architecture defined in 
B-TOS. 
B-TOS Case Study 
B-TOS is a space-based atmospheric mapping mission to characterize the structure of the 
ionosphere using topside sounding techniques.  Accomplishment of this mission on a global 
basis enables more precise corrections to GPS.  The three primary goals of B-TOS are: 
• 0HDVXUHPHQWRIWKHLRQRVSKHUHWRSVLGHHOHFWURQGHQVLW\SURILOH
• 0HDVXUHPHQWRIDQJOHRIDUULYDORIVLJQDOVIURPJURXQGEDVHGEHDFRQV
• 0HDVXUHPHQWRIORFDOL]HGLRQRVSKHULFWXUEXOHQFH
To accomplish these goals, the B-TOS space system uses a swarm architecture of distributed 
small satellites in multiple collaborating clusters.  B-TOS is required to maintain at least a 
minimum altitude for topside sounding, operate at a frozen orbital inclination of 63.4 degrees, 
and use the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System operated by NASA for communication 
with the ground. This is shown in Fig 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual rendering of a swarm of mother and daughter satellites performing topside sounding. 
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GINA and MATE analysis techniques were used to develop the B-TOS mission architecture 
candidates.  The B-TOS GINA/MATE design vector and resulting tradespace enumeration is 
shown in Table 2.  The completely enumerated B-TOS tradespace encompassed over 4000 
unique architectures for the mission.  Each architecture was evaluated for how much utility it 
provided the end user, as well as how much the architecture cost.  The mapping of these two 
measures into utility-cost space produces a Pareto optimal frontier of B-TOS architectures as 
shown in Figure 2.  A Pareto optimal solution is one that can’ t be improved in one dimension 
without sacrificing “goodness” in another dimension.  Five architectures along the frontier are 
especially interesting, as they represent places on the frontier where its slope changes.  These are 
the points labeled A, B, C, D, and E on Figure 2 and their corresponding design vector values are 
shown in Table 3 and Table 4 [6]. 
 
Table 2.  B-TOS design vector variables and values. 
Design Vector Variable Values 
Circular orbit altitude (km) 1100, 1300 
Number of orbital planes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Number of swarms per plane 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Number of satellites per swarm 4, 7, 10, 13 
Radius of swarm (km) 0.18, 1.5, 8.75, 50 
Payload capability 5 configurations of number of sounding antennas and 
capability, short and long range communication 
capability, and on-board data processing capability 
 
Table 3.  B-TOS Pareto optimal frontier architecture attributes. 
Point A B C D E
Altitude (km)
Num of Planes
Swarms/Plane 1 1 1 1 2
Satellites/Swarm 4 7 10 13 13
Swarm Radius (km) 0.18 1.5 8.75 50 50
Functionality Study
<--
  1100   -->
<--
 1 -->
<-- 
 #5  -->
 
 
Table 4. B-TOS payload functionality attributes for Pareto optimal architectures A, B, C, D, and E. 
Functionality Study
Spacecraft Type Mother Daughter
Number 1 3+
Payload (Tx) Yes No
Payload (Rx) Yes Yes
Processing Yes No
TDRSS Link Yes No
Intra-Swarm Link Yes Yes
5
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Figure 2. The B-TOS architecture tradespace plotted in cost-utility space. 
 
In the discussions that follow, architecture candidates will frequently be represented in cost-
utility space as they are in Figure 2.  Each dot on Figure 2 represents a single and unique space 
system architecture that can accomplish the mission, with its corresponding cost and utility.  
Note that the representation in Fig. 2 does not take uncertainty into account. Each point 
represents an architecture that is assumed to deliver its nominal performance at its nominal cost. 
Plots like this are most useful for illustrating how easy it is to define a bad point design (i.e. one 
that deliver low utility at high cost) and for finding the optimal front of architectures (i.e., 
A,B,C,D,E).  We will return to the BTOS case study to discuss policy uncertainty and its 
impacts, but first we introduce a second case study and an uncertainty analysis approach that 
explores the potential of portfolios of solutions as a means to manage uncertainty. 
Broadband Case Study Example  
The struggle of delivering broadband infrastructure has been the focus of a number of recent 
commercial endeavors, ranging in implementation concepts from wired options like cable and 
DSL to wireless delivery options either through ground, air or space based sources.  The most 
successful implementations thus far have been through ground-based systems; however, there are 
also companies seriously exploring the capabilities a space-based platform provides.  The 
primary benefits of a space broadband system over that of any ground based system is that space 
systems have less reliance on any preexisting ground infrastructure and can serve changing 
and/or rapidly growing markets more effectively through the repositioning of satellites and 
adding more capacity to the systems through increasing the complement of space assets or 
satellite upgrades.  Locations where satellite based services have advantages over land-based 
systems include economically developing nations with little pre-existing infrastructure, sea based 
platforms and air based platforms, and remote locations that have little access to land based 
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systems.  Space based broadband systems also have the potential to compete even in markets 
where infrastructure is widespread and competitors already serve customers.  This phenomenon 
can be seen in the satellite TV industry where satellite based TV broadcast customers represent a 
significant share of the overall market.  Through competitive pricing strategies and product 
differentiation, DirecTV and others have proven that space based systems are viable competitors 
with other platforms.   
This case study explores the systems analysis of such a space based broadband architecture.  This 
commercial venture allows the demonstration of the uncertainty analysis framework in a context 
that includes aspects of model and market uncertainty.  Numerous examples of the effects of 
market uncertainty can be seen on the space industry, ranging from uncertainties in launch 
vehicle capacity to meet the evolving needs of low earth satellite delivery to market uncertainties 
that defined bankruptcies in the case of Iridium and GlobalStar space systems. Where the major 
decision criteria for a complex system is market driven, market uncertainties should always be 
considered 
The goal of the systems analysis is to explore the tradespace of potential architectures that satisfy 
a recognized need for a broadband communications infrastructure.  The major feature of the 
architectural concept consists of a satellite network complemented by ground stations.  While we 
have chosen to model a space system to service this market, we have not defined the details of 
the architecture and have left them open for defining the tradespace.  Six tradable parameters in 
the design vector define the boundaries of the tradespace.  These are altitude, inclination, 
satellites per plane, number of orbital planes, payload power, and the area of the phased array 
antenna.  These characteristics and their possible values are given in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Design vector for the Broadband Communication Satellite System 
Name Description Potential Values 
Altitude Altitude for a defined circular orbit LEO(1500km), 
MEO(20184km), 
GEO(35786km) 
Inclination The inclination of the circular orbits. 0-90Û 
Satellites per Plane The number of satellites in each of the 
occupied planes 
1-8 
Number of Planes The number of orbital planes that the 
satellite constellation occupies 
1-10 
Payload Power Downlink power from an individual 
satellite 
1kW-10kW 
Phased Array Area Area in square meters of the total phased 
array antenna area 
1-5m2 
 
 
In addition to the six elements in the design vector, there are also a number of variables that are 
held constant for all architectures in the tradespace or computed as intermediate variables 
through the GINA approach.   
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Figure 3: Systems Simulation Flow 
 
Figure 3 describes the simulation flow that was employed in this case study, based on work by 
Kashitani [7].  The model is initiated with the definition of a constants vector that contains 
parameters of the designs that should remain constant across all of the architectures that are 
being evaluated.  Examples of constants in the Broadband model are scientific constants, such as 
the earth’ s radius, and conversion factors.  Other constants that are included in the Broadband 
model are market constants such as market size and distribution, satellite sizing ratios, and 
launch vehicle performance.  Each box in Figure 3 represents an individual software module and 
each arrow represents the flow of inputs and outputs. 
Model Results 
From the broadband GINA model, thousands of architectures were evaluated.  A set of Pareto 
optimal architectures in terms of subscriber hours and total system cost were found.  In Fig. 4 
only the architectures on the optimal front are shown. The architectures in the upper right of the 
plot are LEO based systems (such as Teledesic) while the ones in the lower left are GEO based 
systems such as Spaceway. 
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Figure 4: Commercial Broadband System Pareto Optimal Front 
Market and Model Uncertainty 
We have introduced two case studies. We first look at market and model uncertainties associated 
with the broadband case and then consider policy uncertainty associated with the mapping 
mission.  
 
Table 6 presents the various sources of uncertainty that were considered in the Broadband case 
study.  Because the Broadband GINA model is relatively coarse, a good deal of the uncertainty 
we are quantifying arises from the rules of thumb that are being used in the model simulation to 
generate results.  However, because of the commercial nature of the case, market uncertainties 
are also introduced.  
Table 6: Sources of uncertainty considered in Broadband Case 
Total Market Size 
Market Capture 
Payload Power per Unit Mass 
Mass Fraction of the Payload with respect to Dry Mass 
Fraction of Dry Mass in Wetmass 
Density of Satellite 
Discount Rate 
Theoretical First Unit Cost per Kilogram 
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The broadband system analysis affords the opportunity to introduce market uncertainty into 
application.  Specifically this market uncertainty is arising from the estimation of three main 
parameters: 1.) total market size of broadband customers, 2.) percent market capture for this 
project, and 3.) the discount rate used in the cash flow analysis.  These three sources serve as 
representative examples of market uncertainty.  Others could have been included such as 
uncertainty in market geographic distribution or competition scenarios.   
Uncertainty in total market size is modeled using a lognormal distribution that is consistent with 
previous market analysis of the broadband market potential.  A lognormal distribution is used for 
the obvious reasons that the market has a lower bound of zero, but a less constrained upper 
bound.  Figure 5 represents the market distribution that was used in the analysis. Percentage of 
market capture is also modeled as a lognormal distribution while discount rate is modeled as a 
normal distribution around 30%. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Uncertainty in potential market size per year 
 
Although we describe market uncertainties in the Broadband case, by no means are market 
uncertainties isolated to commercial ventures.  Military and civil systems also suffer from market 
uncertainties in a number of ways, ranging from competition to demand for the system, as we 
mentioned in the introduction in the case of the military communications architecture. 
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After the uncertainty analysis is complete, the evolved tradespace with the inclusion of 
uncertainty can be represented by Figure 6.  Notice that there is an explicit visualization of the 
uncertainty surrounding the individual Pareto optimal architectures through the use of ellipses to 
represent the standard deviation in distribution of expectations. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Broadband tradespace with the inclusion of uncertainty 
 
From this inclusion of uncertainty, we can conclude that the highest return architectures have the 
highest uncertainty in the service they can support. Furthermore many of the Pareto optimal 
architectures have large overlap in uncertainty making them hard to distinguish in terms of 
overall value. Therefore, it is not straight forward that uncertainty information alone can provide 
the decision maker any clear strategy without some way to codify the uncertainty information 
and form trade-offs.  The method we introduce to accomplish this task is portfolio theory and 
portfolio optimization.  Having roots in economics and finance, portfolio theory has evolved to 
change mental models in investing in liquid assets and we believe it has the potential to change 
mental models in investment strategies in conceptual design as well.   
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Portfolio Theory Applied to Space Systems 
Based around the central premise of maximizing return subject to a given level of risk aversion, 
portfolio theory has evolved since its introduction by Markowitz to a central paradigm in 
investment [8].  We briefly explain and apply portfolio theory to the broadband commercial 
space systems previously described to point out the potential that such an approach can have on 
the design of space systems.  
Once the outcome distributions for individual architectures have been captured, portfolio theory 
can be directly applied to the problem of identifying an optimal investment strategy for a 
decision maker to pursue.  [By investment strategy here we imply investment of resources (time, 
money, etc.) in architectural designs to develop].  Equation 1 presents the portfolio optimization 
algorithm, where r represent the expected value from the architecture, k represent the risk 
aversion coefficient, Q represents the covariance matrix and w is the vector that contains the 
relative investment of each architecture in the tradespace.   
 
0..
1..
2
max
1
≥
=
−
∑
=
wTS
wTS
Qwwkwr
n
i
i
TT
(1) 
Equation 1: Portfolio Optimization Algorithm 
 
The power of portfolio optimization is the ability to allow trade-offs of portfolios along the line 
of value and uncertainty, subject to a given decision makers level of aversion to risk.  Further, 
the approach incorporates the idea of uncorrelated behavior under uncertain conditions which in 
the end allow for diversification of investment that can result in higher returns for a given level 
of uncertainty than would otherwise be possible.   
Figure 7 represents the value/uncertainty tradespace for the broadband communications space 
system.  That is, the value of the system is plotted against the uncertainty associated with it. In 
the broadband case, we have chosen subscriber hour/$ as the overall value criteria, while 
uncertainty is the standard deviation around the expected subscriber hour/$. The tradespace 
forms an efficient frontier denoted by the concave line.   Along this line are portfolio mixes 
whose return cannot be exceeded without accepting a higher degree of uncertainty.  This 
tradespace and the program created to navigate the tradespace allow the decision maker to 
investigate the relative position of a portfolio along the efficient frontier (on the left graph), but 
also the composition of the portfolio (as shown by the table on the right). We believe this type of 
analysis provides both a visual understanding of uncertainty in the tradespace, but also an 
approach to effectively manage it.  
In this case, the LEO based systems dominate the upper right segment of the function per cost 
and uncertainty tradespace, implying higher returns and higher uncertainty than MEO or GEO 
based missions.  Thus Teledesic (& the narrowband Iridium) initially chose LEO.  However the 
uncertainty, and in this case risk, associated with these systems is so high that the use of GEO 
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based designs, while returning lower performance, can be a better choice for a risk averse 
decision maker. This is the path that most other commercial systems have chosen to take. Even 
the commercial systems that initially went with more risk have been forced by the market realties 
of raising money to focus on the MEO and GEO systems. More generally, this case illustrates 
that the best way to consider the design may be to consider portfolios of architectures and carry 
balanced diverse sets of designs as long as the possibility exists to diversify uncertainty. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Portfolio Tradespace of Broadband Communications System 
 
Policy Uncertainty 
In the last section, we analyzed market/model uncertainties. In this section, we consider a 
different class of uncertainties namely policy uncertainties but model them with the same 
conceptual approach.  
Budget changes are the most frequently reported action taken by policy makers, and it is not hard 
to understand why.  Government and military space system programs are subject to budget 
approvals each year by their own agencies as well as the Congress.  Each year, a program’ s 
budget can – and frequently does – change.  For fiscal years 1996-1998, 32% of defense 
programs experienced a budget reduction, 53% experience a budget increase and only 15% 
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received the budget they requested.  Hence a space architect can conclude that the probability 
that the budget will be changed is much larger than the probability that it will stay on the 
nominal plan. Thus, budget uncertainty is perhaps the most pervasive policy uncertainty facing 
government and military systems today. This is due to the nature of the competing stakeholder 
demands that are balanced and adjudicated through the budget resolution process each year. 
Since these are constantly shifting, the budget for any given system will be subject to this kind of 
uncertainty. Thus this uncertainty is irreducible based on human behavior and the nature of the 
budget process. Unlike technical uncertainty, which can often be reduced this kind is unlikely to 
change except in dire emergencies. 
Potential effects of budget uncertainty can be examined during conceptual design of space 
system architectures, and these effects can better inform architecture choices that will be robust 
to budget changes.  After space system architectures are modeled with GINA and MATE 
techniques, the effects of budget changes can be explored by varying the yearly budget allocation 
for the program.  When the yearly budget level is pushed below the nominal yearly budget level 
for a given architecture, that architecture’ s schedule will need to be extended to accommodate 
the lower yearly budget level.  Using historical data relating program schedule extension data to 
resulting program cost increases, the extra cost of extending the program schedule can be 
calculated.  This is the cost a program bears if it should fall subject to a budget reduction. 
A government space system program manager contemplating which of many Pareto optimal 
architectures to choose should be aware of how each of those Pareto architectures behaves 
relative to varying yearly program budget levels.  Program budget increases or appropriations 
equal to requests will not in theory inhibit a program from meeting its original cost and schedule 
goals.  However, budget reductions are likely to do this.  If an architecture is initially selected, 
and later the Congress chooses to reduce the budget available each year for that program, the 
program will likely incur a cost overrun as well as a schedule slippage according to historical 
data.  These effects in turn draw increased Congressional oversight to a program, increasing its 
chances for being cancelled altogether in future years.  This is one vivid example of why a 
program manager should be concerned about budget uncertainty on his or her program, and in 
particular, about downside risks. 
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Figure 8. Parameters associated with Pareto front set of architectures in cost and performance space. 
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We can describe in generalized terms how a budget reduction affects a program’ s total budget, 
and identify three distinct stages of the behavior of the Pareto optimal front of a set of 
architecture candidates.  First, we identify the architectures that lie along the Pareto front in a 
given architecture cost–performance tradespace, and call this set of architectures i.  In this set, 
there is a minimum acceptable performance (pmin) and its associated cost (cmin), and there is a 
maximum achievable performance (pmax) and its associated cost (cmax).  These will tend to be at 
the extremes of the Pareto frontier, as illustrated in Figure 8.  Each architecture in i will have 
some nominal program duration in years, di.   
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Figure 9. General behavior of the Pareto optimal front of a set of system architectures being affected by budget 
reductions.  The solid line represents the nominal case and the dashed line represents the reduced 
budget case. 
 
 
If we overlay the budget reduction cost–performance tradespace onto the nominal cost–
performance tradespace, we see that they are identical for a yearly budget level, bi, greater than 
cmax / dmax, and we call this behavior Stage 0.  This is shown graphically in Figure 9.  For a yearly 
budget level less than cmax / dmax but greater than cmin / dmin, the Pareto fronts of the budget 
reduction case and the nominal case will appear to diverge at some points when they are overlaid 
in the cost–performance tradespace.  This separation of the Pareto fronts indicates that some 
architectures are being affected by the reduced budget level while others are not.  We will call 
this behavior Stage I, and can identify the critical yearly budget level at which the Pareto front of 
architectures transitions into this Stage as cmax / dmax.  Finally, for a yearly budget level less than 
cmin / dmin , the Pareto fronts of the budget reduction case and the nominal case completely 
separate, indicating that no architecture in the Pareto optimal set is unaffected by a reduced 
budget level.  We will call this behavior Stage I, and can identify the critical yearly budget value 
at which the Pareto front of architectures transitions into Stage II as cmin / dmin.  
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These Stages identified above are guidelines for a program manager.  A range of likely yearly 
program budgets can be examined to determine if they put the program architecture Pareto front 
into Stage 0, I, or II.  If a program falls in Stage 0 for all likely yearly budgets, then a program 
manager can feel more confident in selecting any architecture candidate since they are all robust 
to the anticipated range of budget uncertainty.  If a program falls in Stage I, then a program 
manager may want to consider robustness to budget uncertainty as a criteria in selecting a final 
system architecture, since cost and schedule overruns that can result from budget uncertainty will 
increase oversight and the probability of cancellation later on.  Lastly, if a program falls in Stage 
II, then none of the architecture candidates are robust to budget uncertainty, and a program 
manager will want to take some action to avoid potential repercussions in the program’ s future.  
These might include (but are not limited to) generating new budget-robust architecture 
candidates to choose from, seeking increased protection from budget uncertainty from agency 
directors, or making a stronger case to appropriators for a larger budget.   
Case study application: B-TOS 
The budget uncertainty analysis was applied to the B-TOS mission.  The performance and cost 
attributes of the Pareto optimal set of five architectures is shown in Figure 10, along with the 
critical values that describe the transition points between Stages 0, I, and II.  The five Pareto 
optimal architectures in cost–performance tradespace are shown in Figure 2, and are labeled A, 
B, C, D, and E.  Figure 10 (a) – (d) graphically shows the overlay of the nominal and the budget 
reduction cases for decreasing levels of yearly program budgets. 
We find that the Stage 0 to Stage I transition occurs at $80.3M/yr, and the Stage I to Stage II 
transition occurs at $18.6M/yr.  Since B-TOS is a small military mission, the likelihood of its 
initially receiving or sustaining an $80M/yr budget is probably very small (typically such 
missions stay under $20-50M/yr).  Thus, a program manager concerned with budget uncertainty 
may not want to choose architecture candidate E, even though it is the highest performing 
architecture, because it is adversely affected by yearly budgets below $80M/yr.  If the program 
manager foresees that a yearly budget of perhaps $25M/yr is far more likely for a small military 
mission, then architecture candidate A would be a good choice, because it is robust to budget 
uncertainty.  But if the yearly budgets for small military missions are more likely to be in the 
$5M - $10M /yr range, then none of these Pareto front architecture candidates for B-TOS would 
be robust to budget uncertainty.  So what is the B-TOS program manager to do now?  
Unfortunately, a small military mission is unlikely to warrant the agency director making a 
special effort to fence this one particular program’ s budget, and it is also unlikely to attract much 
support from appropriators who have larger concerns.  If these are the case, the program manager 
and the program team may then wish to return to the drawing board and come up with less 
expensive architecture alternatives, or perhaps descope the program’ s requirements in an effort 
to create a budget robust architecture choice. 
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B-TOS case study:  Comparison of nominal and $80M per year program budget
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B-TOS case study:  Comparison of nominal and $25M per year program budget
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B-TOS case study:  Comparison of nominal and $10M per year program budget
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B-TOS case study:  Comparison of nominal and $5M per year program budget
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Figure 10.  B-TOS case study results for nominal and budget reduction cases for decreasing yearly budgets. 
 19
Conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the effect of uncertainty on several classes of space system 
architectures. These are used as models of engineering systems. We have shown that there are 
many types of uncertainty. These range from technical uncertainty (does the propulsion system 
deliver the specified thrust with the specified efficiency) to market based uncertainty (what will 
be the response of people in London to the space based delivery of T1 links compared to 
procuring the service through fiber) to policy uncertainty (will the Congress keep funding the 
development of this system at the same level as last year?).   
When these uncertainties are taken into account in the design of these complex space system 
architectures a number of interesting conclusions follow. The first is that the design points may 
be quite different with uncertainty incorporated from the beginning as compared to not 
incorporating the uncertainty. This is clearly seen in the broadband case where the LEO based 
systems have clear performance advantages over all other systems. Thus Teledesic (& the 
narrowband Iridium) initially chose LEO.  However the uncertainty and in this case risk 
associated with these systems is so high that the use of GEO based designs, while returning 
lower performance, is the path that most commercial systems have chosen. More generally, this 
case illustrates that the best way to consider the design may be to consider portfolios of 
architectures and carry balanced diverse sets of designs as long as possible. 
 The second conclusion is that some of the uncertainty is caused by human behavior that is 
endemic to the nature of the way that stakeholders balance their interests associated with these 
systems. This was seen in the cost capping analysis of the ionospheric mapper. The likelihood 
that there will be budget changes in the design and construction of these systems is much larger 
than the likelihood that they will get exactly what they request. This is due to the dynamic nature 
of the political process by which decisions are made and policies are decided. Given that it flows 
from the nature of human behavior, it is a kind of irreducible uncertainty (unlike many types of 
technical uncertainty). We showed that it was possible to consider this kind of irreducible 
uncertainty in the design of the system and actually make choices knowing one is subject to this 
uncertainty.  
A third observation flows from consideration of how some of the commercial and military space 
system architectures have been used in practice. GP S was originally designed for guiding long-
range nuclear bombers to their targets (which accounts for the very low power signals). DSP was 
originally designed for finding strategic ballistic missile launches and relaying information on 
those launches to the National Command Authority in Washington. The primary civilian use of 
GPS is now helping hikers not get lost & providing timing signals to cell phone networks while 
the primary military use is in close air support. DSP is now used primarily to find short-range 
tactical ballistic missiles and relay those results to forces in theater. Both of these substantially 
different uses arise from the fact that the original architectures had enough uncertainty in their 
use (a kind of flexibility) that the interaction with creative humans led to new ways of thinking 
about and using the systems. This indicates that uncertainty is not a synonym for risk. If the 
architecture of DSP had been so tightly specified that it could not be used in any other way than 
finding strategic ballistic missiles then it would have fulfilled it’ s original mission and be unable 
to fulfill the subsequent missions (which where not envisioned when it was first flown). In a 
similar manner, the development of the large commercial market associated with GPS was a 
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complete surprise to the original designers of the architecture but the architecture was robust 
enough to accommodate this kind of use. 
We now generalize to engineering systems and try to draw some analogous conclusions. Thus 
the three conclusions about uncertainty and engineering systems that flow from this analysis are 
1) Engineering Systems must be designed with uncertainty as one of the central organizing 
principles. 
2) Since Engineering Systems have management and social dimensions and thus involve 
human interactions, there is an irreducible uncertainty associated with these dimensions 
that will affect the design of the system. 
3) Uncertainty in use may allow the engineering system to satisfy quite different missions 
from the original one. Thus, uncertainty and risk may not be correlated; indeed it is 
humans interacting with the uncertainty that allows the flexibility to be creatively used. 
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